Li Yousheng (2014)

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IV. The different backgrounds and performances of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping:

(I) Mao Zedong

Two key figures in the history of the Chinese Communist Party’s revolution and rule played a crucial role in turning the tide: Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Although Hua Guofeng had already reversed the situation before Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping was both a supporter and beneficiary of Hua Guofeng’s actions. Mao Zedong, within the context of Marxist-Leninist urban proletarian revolution theory, achieved victory in the Chinese revolution with extremely pragmatic methods and vision. He then transformed his pragmatism into illegitimate means of authoritarianism to forcibly implement his utopian ideals of peasantry. Deng Xiaoping, after Mao Zedong’s death, within the grand tradition of Mao Zedong Thought within the CCP, boldly promoted his pragmatic view of “a good cat catches mice” and achieved success, becoming known as the chief architect of China’s reform and opening up and modernization. Here, we will only discuss the relationship between their actions and their family backgrounds, rather than a comprehensive evaluation of any one person. We will first discuss Mao Zedong.

Mao Zedong’s family was not an intellectual family. Mao’s father was an ordinary farmer who had served in the army and done business. Although he knew a few words, he strongly opposed Mao’s further education and entry into the rural intellectual class. Mao’s mother was a Buddhist, and Mao had discussed with her how to persuade his father to become a Buddhist. The Gelaohui, influenced by Taoist thought, was powerful in Hunan. In Mao’s hometown, they had gathered crowds to cause trouble and organized the eating of wealthy people. Therefore, Mao’s family was somewhat similar to my family: the reason why Mao and his father were able to go to the city to study and be influenced by new ideas was that their father had worked hard from being an ordinary farmer to earn some money to support his son’s schooling. Such families were still under the influence of Taoist thought in the rural areas at that time, close to the original thought of Confucius, but far removed from the traditional Confucian thought of the imperial era after the Qin and Han dynasties. [2]

Mao’s family background was the opposite of Zhou Enlai’s; the latter was closer to Confucian tradition and farther from Taoism. Zhou Enlai’s style was closer to the Confucian ideal of moderation and elegance, thanks to his excellent early family education. Mao, on the other hand, also studied the Confucian Five Classics and Four Books in his youth, but that was a distorted version of Confucianism from the transitional era, insufficient to help him transcend the influence of his family.

Throughout Chinese history, intellectuals, when successful, sought to benefit the world, upholding the Confucian tradition; when unsuccessful, they cultivated their own virtue, working the land and refining their minds through the philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi. Furthermore, Laozi and Zhuangzi’s ideal of a self-sufficient small-scale peasant economy perfectly aligned with the rural realities of my country for millennia. As a result, the dominant ideology in rural my country leaned towards Daoism, rather than Confucianism. Mao Zedong, growing up in the countryside, was unconsciously imbued with the Daoist spirit. Historically, figures from rural backgrounds like Liu Bang and Zhu Yuanzhang also exhibited clear Daoist tendencies. The Confucian tradition referred to here is the official Confucian thought tradition established after the Qin and Han dynasties, which differs fundamentally from the thought of Confucius and Mencius.

If Confucianism had any influence on rural China, it was limited to the intellectual class; ordinary farmers were more inclined towards Buddhism and Taoism. Judging from my hometown, Confucian influence was likely confined to landlord and bureaucratic families. Farmers with muddy legs were unlikely to enter Confucian temples; those were places for bureaucratic intellectuals. Both Confucianism and Taoism idealize a primitive society, and the farmers of rural China, constrained by human nature, were closer to the ideas of Confucius and Taoism, but further removed from the Confucian tradition that followed the Qin and Han dynasties. Confucian scholars in the imperial era had to learn the art of currying favor with those in power, and thus remained indifferent to the countless corpses littering the streets of Shijiazhuang after its liberation.

Western scholars often describe Mao Zedong as a peasant, meaning his background preserved many characteristics of ordinary peasants: his sympathy and understanding of the peasantry was the guarantee of his ultimate victory during the war years, and the Communist Party gained the support of the vast majority of peasants; influenced by the peasants’ ideal of an egalitarian society, he upheld peasant utopianism throughout his life, rather than Marxist-Leninist communist ideology; due to the natural practical rationality of peasants living in a quasi-primitive society, Mao Zedong abandoned all theories and dogmas throughout his life, viewing life and politics with an extremely pragmatic perspective, the so-called “a monk holding an umbrella, lawless and unrestrained,” which led to his predicament during the Cultural Revolution, and in his later years, he helplessly spent his time weeping. Both law and heaven are external to man. If law is the framework of a man-made secondary society, then heaven is the manifestation of the unmanipulable nature of this secondary society—”the master of the secondary society is God, not man”—while the master of the primordial society is man, not God. Chinese peasants living in a quasi-primitive society did not use the concept of law at all, nor did they have a concept of heaven; they had animistic ideas. For them, heaven was merely one of many deities, distant and vaguely defined, completely different from the Western image of God. [3]

(II) Deng Xiaoping: Understanding Deng Xiaoping through a Comparison of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping

Deng Xiaoping’s family background was similar to that of Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai, which enabled him to study in France. Deng Xiaoping also apparently visited the Soviet Union. Based on my reading of materials about Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao, and Zhou Enlai, I’m struck by how Zhou Enlai was the most open-minded and possessed the most Western-oriented, universally rational perspective. Lin Biao’s ideas were closest to Mao Zedong’s utopian peasant ideology. Deng Xiaoping lacked both, but possessed a unique perspective on the Chinese power structure, or what could be called “Chinese characteristics.” The Chinese revolution followed a path different from both Western democratization and Soviet socialist totalitarianism. It initially followed Mao Zedong’s utopian peasant path, later shifting to Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic theory: socialist politics combined with capitalist economics. Deng Xiaoping’s family background gave him a comprehensive and profound understanding of the traditional power structure of Chinese society, but he lacked Mao Zedong’s egalitarian peasant ideals and sentiments.

Deng Xiaoping is famous for his three rises and falls. The first was due to his opposition to the then-central leadership’s urban-centric revolutionary ideology. This urban-centric ideology, rooted in Western modern thought and Marxism, was also a Soviet revolutionary concept. However, Deng Xiaoping believed this ideology failed to fully utilize the realities of traditional Chinese society. The second was his downfall at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, followed by a reinstatement in 1973. The third was in the spring of 1976, when he was stripped of all posts but retained his Party membership. I feel there are some similarities between Deng Xiaoping’s first and third downfalls. It was precisely these downfalls that made his views and abilities known, becoming a stepping stone for his later comeback and further advancement. Hundreds of millions of Chinese people, especially grassroots cadres, only developed a deep impression of Deng Xiaoping after his reinstatement and subsequent downfall, enabling him to resolutely shift further to the right after Hua Guofeng and achieve success.

Of the four figures—Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping—only Mao Zedong came from a wealthy peasant family; the others came from gentry-official backgrounds. However, in terms of personal character and work style, Deng Xiaoping was most similar to Mao Zedong, both stubbornly adhering to their own ideas and lacking the spirit of compromise and cooperation. Mao Zedong later said, “No one can suppress Deng Xiaoping.” He didn’t use this statement about Zhou Enlai or Lin Biao, but only about Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping: both were determined to push forward their own ideas and directions in the face of numerous possibilities and directions within the secondary society. Lin Biao was a highly professional military man, a typical example of how secondary society, by dehumanizing marginal talents and excessively developing a person’s peripheral potential, employed extreme autocracy in military affairs to ensure victory. However, after victory, he harbored the idea of ​​retiring after achieving success. It is said that in 1959, Mao and Lin had private conversations for over a month before Lin agreed to return to service. My overall impression from reading online materials about Lin Biao is that he was a product of the pressures of his era and the desire for victory in war; a deformed man who lived and worked solely for victory. He was not a person of social life, much less a person of politics. After the September 13 Incident in 1971, when disseminating materials to the masses, upon hearing that Lin Biao, after the victory in the Northeast War, ignored Mao Zedong’s repeated urgings and hesitated to advance into the Central Plains, I immediately realized that this was consistent with his immediate retirement after the liberation. During the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, there was a saying that the Communist army would occupy a province; Lin Biao’s advance into the three northeastern provinces was a preparation for retreating into Mongolia at any time. Faced with the powerful Soviet Union, the Kuomintang army could not enter Mongolia to fight. As a deformed man who lived and worked solely for victory in war, Lin Biao single-handedly created the miracle of the Communist Party’s victory. If the Northeast War was about securing living space for the weak Communist Party, then the advance into the Central Plains was the opposite—it was about seizing living space from the Kuomintang, which had become the weaker side. Lin Biao clearly hesitated in the face of this change in the Communist Party’s position. [1, 4] This is also why, among Mao, Lin, Zhou, and Deng, only Lin Biao was most inclined towards Mao Zedong’s utopian peasant ideology. Based on the materials I have read, only Lin and Mao stubbornly maintained the frugal lifestyle of the war years.

If Lin Biao and Mao Zedong’s sympathy for the disadvantaged peasantry reflects traditional Chinese thinking, then Zhou Enlai’s support for Mao’s utopian ideals about peasantry and his sympathy for the poor embody more of a Western democratic perspective. Zhou Enlai was a man who could coexist peacefully with diverse individuals and was always ready to compromise—precisely the essence of modern Western democracy. Had Zhou Enlai not died prematurely from cancer, he would have left space for diverse people to live and speak, including figures like Jiang Qing, who are still praised by some. Given Zhou Enlai’s knowledge and insight, the most likely outcome would have been for him to oversee the proceduralization and democratization of central decision-making, restoring the early democratic procedures of the CCP and implementing Western democracy at the Politburo and Central Committee levels. This is a problem that China has yet to resolve effectively. The author firmly believes that Zhou Enlai possessed the vision and magnanimity to change Chinese history and leave behind personal convictions, but history did not grant him this opportunity, and he was unwilling to impose his will on anyone. The situation after Mao Zedong’s death perfectly suited Zhou Enlai’s personality and needs; had he lived, he would not have let this opportunity slip away.

Zhou Enlai was clearly not a dictator like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Secondary societies face numerous different directions and choices, often without clear advantages or disadvantages, especially in the long run, differing only in direction and decision-making. In this context, Western democracies developed voting systems, where decisions are made by the majority. However, majority rule lacks long-term and profound consideration, resulting in the anarchy exhibited in Western countries. Before liberation, the Chinese Communist Party faced powerful enemies, and people voluntarily supported authoritarianism, still largely allowing for the expression of dissenting opinions. In the peaceful post-liberation period, democracy should have been more open, but in reality, it rapidly advanced towards personal totalitarianism. This was related to Mao Zedong’s personality and his peasant background, which lacked the habit of coexisting with different people in secondary societies. This led to the suppression of dissenting opinions, creating the abnormal situation where even disagreements had to be resolved by raising one’s hand. Even so, during the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong used abnormal methods such as bypassing the central government to directly mobilize the masses and establishing Cultural Revolution Leading Groups to replace the central government. Mao Zedong used these extraordinary means to forcibly promote his utopian ideals of peasantry.

Deng Xiaoping lacked Mao Zedong’s utopian ideals of peasantry, but he used the same methods to seize power and make decisions unilaterally. Prominent examples are the handling of the Vietnam War (1979-1990), which began with an invasion, and the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. Amidst widespread discussion, Deng Xiaoping decisively decided to send troops. In the early 1980s, I was studying in Britain. At that time, the embassy regularly briefed students on the domestic political situation. When the Vietnam War was discussed, most students advocated against war, saying, “Why fight when we’re so poor!” I firmly believe this was the thinking of most ordinary Chinese people. So, when conveying various differing opinions within the central government, and mentioning concerns that the Soviet Union might attack from the north, the pro-war Deng Xiaoping replied, “I guarantee it, (the Soviet Union) won’t!” I still remember people immediately commenting below, “What a load of rubbish! Deng Xiaoping guarantees nothing!”

That’s very true. If Deng Xiaoping were to offer a guarantee, he should have set aside money to compensate the Chinese people for their losses should the Soviet Union attack China. At the very least, he should have said: “If the Soviet Union were to attack, I, Deng Xiaoping, and all my pro-war subordinates will commit suicide to atone for our sins.” Deng Xiaoping didn’t say that. At that time, China’s decision-making circles didn’t take discussions of such a major issue as war, involving the lives of tens of thousands of people, to that level, and didn’t allow Deng Xiaoping to offer empty guarantees.

If Zhou Enlai were in Deng Xiaoping’s position, he would have adopted the majority opinion and a more moderate approach instead of sending troops. To appease those advocating for military intervention, Zhou Enlai would likely have used the Western-style debate and voting process—a practice common in the early days of the CCP—to tell the opposition: This is the result of democratic decision-making procedures; don’t blame me.

It is said that Li Zongwu’s “Thick-skinned and Black-hearted Theory” is very popular in mainland China, with over two hundred books titled “Thick-skinned and Black-hearted Theory.” As is well known, the core of Li Zongwu’s “Thick-skinned and Black-hearted Theory” is a simple belief: thick skin and a black heart are the key to success in society. The highly autocratic social rules in Chinese history, lacking legal oversight, opened the door for those with thick skin and a black heart. This behavior of the thick-skinned and black-hearted contradicts the Communist Party’s ideal of the masses being masters of their own destiny, because that is precisely the characteristic of exploitative class behavior as described by the Communist Party. If the Mao Zedong era used authoritarian and cruel methods to forcibly promote egalitarianism without blocking the path of the thick-skinned and black-hearted at the level of legal rules, then the failure to establish sufficient legal rules to prevent the thick-skinned and black-hearted from exploiting loopholes during the Deng Xiaoping era’s advocacy of economic capitalism was a mistake. The author firmly believes that if Zhou Enlai were alive, he would have taken corresponding measures, preventing the popularity of Li Zongwu’s “Thick-skinned and Black-hearted Theory” in mainland China. The popularity of Li Zongwu’s “Thick-skinned and Black-hearted Theory” among the people of mainland China shows that the door to success for the thick-skinned and black-hearted has not been blocked. Even with this convenient opportunity, the “thick-skinned and ruthless” ideology could hardly gain popularity during the Mao Zedong era, under the strong trend of egalitarianism.

V. Conclusion:

This article demonstrates the profound influence of China’s quasi-primitive rural society on people by examining the different backgrounds and behaviors of the first generation of Communist Party leaders. It further discusses the different behaviors of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping and their relationship with their family backgrounds. The conclusion is that China’s rural society, unpolluted by civilization, had a longer-term vision and deeper considerations regarding natural human nature, despite its simple appearance.

literature

[1] Ya Ye (2014): Lin Biao: A Brilliant Historical Mystery. Consensus Net: http://www.21ccom.net/articles/history/xiandai/20141011114527.html; Original source: KD Community. [2] You Sheng (2005): Mao Zedong and Taoist Thought. See: http://taoism21cen.com/Chinesechat/maoyudao.html.

[3] You Sheng (2011): On the Primitive Nature of Chinese Religious Culture from the Perspective of Confucius’s Attitude Towards Ghosts and Gods. Xue Deng, Issue 18, http://www.confucius2000.com/admin/list.asp?id=4844.

[4] Bi Tangshu (2014): Was Lin Biao a martyr or a traitor? Consensus Net: http://www.21ccom.net/articles/history/xiandai/20140926113877.html.

(The original manuscript was written in 2013, and it was rewritten in October 2014 with major changes, but the basic content remained the same.)

author By Dr. You-Sheng Li

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