Reflections on Reading Liu Zaifu's Eighth Edition of "Farewell to Revolution": Evaluating Mao Zedong Requires Specific Analysis Rather Than General Assessment (Part 1)

Li Yousheng

Abstract: Dividing human society into a natural, primitive society and a man-made, two-tiered society reveals that Chinese civilization began in the primitive society while Western civilization began in the two-tiered society. Furthermore, because both Confucianism and Taoism idealize the primitive society, Chinese civilization lacks an understanding of the inhumanity of the two-tiered society. This paper re-analyzes Mao Zedong’s path and its lingering social impact from the perspective of the two-tiered society theory, arguing that this Mao Zedong phenomenon is a concentrated manifestation of the primitive society complex in traditional Chinese culture that ignores the differences between the two-tiered societies. The author begins by introducing Li Zehou’s evaluation of Mao Zedong and finally returns to two other prominent ideas presented in Mao’s *Farewell to Revolution*: historical tragedy and the philosophy of survival. The author uses the two-tiered society theory to re-examine the prominent ideas in *Farewell to Revolution*, also demonstrating the possibility of overcoming this historical predicament.

* * *

I read some blog posts about Mao Zedong online, and my general impression is that there are two extremes in praise and criticism: one side regards him as a great leader, and the other side regards him as a devil who deserved to die. From the perspective of the two-tier society theory, these two opinions represent different directions of modern people creating a two-tier society, and different biases in the future direction of modern China. As we all know, the future direction of modern China is not determined by blog posts. For more information on the two-tier society theory, readers can refer to the author’s previous articles and my blog. [1]

As for how to evaluate Mao Zedong, Li Zehou provides us with a good example: analyze specific problems in specific ways and avoid general evaluations.

Liu Zaifu recently published an article titled “Reflections on the Publication of the Eighth Edition of Farewell to Revolution,” which was reprinted on Consensus Net with a striking title: How does Li Zehou view Mao Zedong? [2] As a famous philosopher and social activist who grew up in Mao Zedong’s China, experienced different eras of supporting and opposing Mao, and now lives in the United States for many years at the age of eighty, he is well-versed in both East and West and can be said to be the most qualified person to give a comprehensive evaluation of Mao Zedong. Li Zehou obviously does not want to do so.

Liu Zaifu said, “The most interesting thing is Li Zehou’s description of Mao Zedong.” In his book *Farewell to Revolution*, Li Zehou “did not offer a general evaluation of Mao Zedong’s historical merits and demerits, but only discussed two of Mao Zedong’s ideological obsessions. These two ‘obsessions’ were, firstly, a blind faith in war experience; and secondly, a blind faith in ideology.” Li Zehou’s pointing out of Mao Zedong’s two obsessions here is very profound, and his analysis is also very insightful:

War certainly requires deception (all’s fair in war), and a life-or-death struggle. However, in peacetime, people demand a normal life, which necessitates the rule of law and a shared sense of security. War relies on organization and mobilization, while peacetime requires everyone to work, labor, and contribute to the community.

Regarding Mao Zedong’s obsession with ideology, Li Zehou analyzed:

Mao Zedong emphasized that “public opinion should be created” before doing anything important, that is, ideology should come first. However, in social life, ideology is not the first prerequisite. That is to say, people need food, clothing, shelter and transportation first, and then ideology. If these two are reversed, it will cause disaster. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, China had reached the point where it would rather have the “weeds” of socialism than the “seedlings” of capitalism, and the “late arrival” of socialism than the “on time” of capitalism. All common sense and routines of life were unimportant, and the only thing that mattered was “ism”. [2]

Li Zehou’s strategy and approach of “analyzing specific problems in specific ways” in his evaluation of Mao Zedong is well worth learning, and this also includes the title of his book, “Farewell to Revolution.” One of the main imagery depicted in thousands of years of traditional Chinese poetry is the sorrow of parting. “The moon has its phases of waxing and waning, just as people have their joys and sorrows, partings and reunions; nothing in this world is ever perfect.” Even if Li Zehou’s “Farewell to Revolution” lacks the sorrow of parting, it still carries a sense of bittersweet emotion. Li Zehou, who rose to fame in China in the 1960s, was, like 600 million Chinese people, a participant in the modern Chinese revolution, a part of this mass revolution. His farewell to revolution was first and foremost a farewell to the revolution alongside the Chinese people.

After Mao Zedong’s death, the Chinese people, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and others, bid farewell to the revolutionary era of Mao Zedong. This farewell to revolution was not intended to oppose or criticize it. Li Zehou’s book “Farewell to Revolution” elevates this farewell to revolution by the Chinese people to a philosophical level, and also carries the implication of warning the world not to go back to the old ways.

Returning to the point made at the beginning of this article about the two extreme factions in domestic evaluations of Mao Zedong, both should learn from Li Zehou’s approach of being accommodating and balanced, and from his consideration of the overall situation rather than going to extremes. One point everyone agrees on is: bidding farewell to revolution. Neither of these two extreme factions in domestic evaluations of Mao Zedong intends to use violent revolution to promote their own ideas; otherwise, they wouldn’t be writing articles online but preparing for revolution underground.

As for Mr. Li Zehou’s “philosophy of eating,” it is merely a popular summary of Marxist philosophy. These are a few sentences that Li Zehou and several generations of Chinese people have often heard in their growth and life: “People must first live, that is, they must first eat, and then they need food, clothing, shelter and transportation. Only then can they have thoughts, culture, ideology, etc. This is the basic principle of Marxist historical materialism.” [2]

I also strongly agree with Mr. Li’s suggestion to replace the “philosophy of struggle” with the “philosophy of eating.” However, I would like to point out another aspect of the issue from the perspective of a two-tiered society theory: namely, the internal logic and rationality of Mao Zedong’s philosophy of struggle and his two obsessions. I would also like to point out that both extreme factions in the domestic evaluation of Mao Zedong should learn from him and follow his path, if they, like Mao Zedong, firmly believe in their own words and ideals.

As far as I know, revolutions in the world can be divided into two types: one is a revolution that arises spontaneously and naturally, such as the Russian October Revolution and the Chinese Xinhai Revolution; the other is a peasant revolution led by Mao Zedong, which took decades to ignite a small spark into a prairie fire. The revolution Marx spoke of is the first type, a revolution nurtured by society, an inevitable product of social development, and also the essence of historical materialism.

I have carefully read Marx’s discourse on the Asiatic mode of production many times. Although there are changes and self-conflicts in Marx’s discourse, at least Marx once believed that Asian society is different from European society. Asian society lacks class differentiation and tends to stagnate. Recently, many people have realized that ancient China did not have the European-style class and class struggle that Marx talked about. [3] This is the same conclusion that Liang Shuming reached decades ago. Liang concluded that China is a society with “professional division” and “ethical orientation”, lacking “class division”. [4]

My impression from reading European history is that medieval Europe, from the fall of the Roman Empire to the modern Renaissance, was stagnant, hence its term “Dark Ages” used by many scholars. During this period, Europe lacked the large-scale class struggles seen in earlier and later periods. Serfs, dependent on landowners, formed independent, competing local forces. A unified Christian culture effectively limited the violence and cruelty of this competition, as evidenced by the popularity of chivalry. Only after this medieval stagnation was broken did the changes predicted by Marx occur: serfs became workers, and then, in the proletarian revolution, became masters. In China, where class differentiation is lacking, the peasant revolution led by Mao Zedong was different: poor peasants and hired laborers, after receiving land, remained farmers until a few years later when they relinquished their land and became commune members. The cause of agricultural collectivization was the difficulty the state faced in cheaply purchasing grain from farmers: a cousin of mine in my hometown of Hebei was driven to suicide during this mass movement called “unified grain purchase and distribution” because his family simply didn’t have enough grain. It’s clear that the equal distribution of land was intended to defeat the Kuomintang, which had started its revolution a few years earlier than the Communist Party: Ms. Zhang Rong described the tug-of-war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in her mother’s hometown of Siping as advantageous to the Communist victory. After the Kuomintang drove out the Communists, they returned the equally distributed land and property to the landlords and rich peasants, and executed Communist peasant cadres. When the Communists returned, they resumed land reform and massacred landlords and rich peasants. The rich were, after all, a minority, and the protracted struggle led to peasant solidarity and a fighting spirit.

The author reveals that Marx’s theory that class struggle drives continuous social change is a summary of social change against the backdrop of escalating wars over five thousand years. China compresses this process of escalating wars into the Warring States period of more than two hundred years, while there are two thousand years of stable periods before and after the Warring States period. [5] In Liang Shuming’s view, there are no revolutions in Chinese history, only periodic upheavals. [4]