The Differences Between Eastern and Western War Cultures: (Part Four) Sun Tzu's Art of War and the Ancient Greek Phalanx: Differences Between Eastern and Western War Cultures

Yu Sheng
(from the 24th issue of “Learning Lamp”)

This led to the differences in early war cultures between Eastern and Western civilizations. I will not go into detail here, but I will only compare Sun Tzu’s Art of War with the ancient Greek phalanx. Both are signs of the long-term accumulation of war experience and the maturation of the phalanx. They also signify the different war cultures of the East and the West. Sun Tzu’s Art of War is traditionally attributed to Sun Tzu, who led the Wu army to defeat Chu. Modern scholars mostly believe that it is a work from the Warring States period, reflecting the reality of war culture during the Warring States period. [10] Even so, Sun Tzu’s Art of War was written earlier than Sun Bin’s Art of War, which will be discussed together here. Yang Kuan believes that the period between the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period was a time of great social and cultural change in China, and the same was true for war. The wars in the Warring States Period were very different from those in the Spring and Autumn Period. “In the Warring States Period, a conscription system based on counties was implemented, and adult farmers were conscripted as the main force. Infantry and cavalry began to fight, and the number of troops increased greatly. Due to the use of sharp iron weapons, especially the use of crossbows with powerful long-range shots, it was no longer possible to fight with chariot formations. Therefore, field battles and encirclement battles of infantry and cavalry were widely adopted. The command of battles began to become a specialized skill, military strategy began to be emphasized, and generals and strategists who specialized in commanding battles began to emerge.” [5]

The English translation of *The Art of War* is titled *The Art of War*, which views war itself as an art with a psychological integrative function. Confucius and the Confucian scholars before and after him interpreted social life as an art form based on rites and music, recording this in the *Analects*. Similarly, Sun Tzu, born into a family of generals, interpreted the life of generals in the Warring States period as an art form based on military strategy, recording this in *The Art of War*. The difference lies in their perspectives: Confucius focused on society as a whole, while Sun Tzu focused on the life of generals.

As described in Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, the chapter “Military Maneuvering” describes an army: “Swift as the wind, silent as the forest, fierce as fire, immovable as a mountain, unfathomable as the shadows, and swift as thunder.” It’s difficult for a modern reader to grasp that an army could be likened to wind, forest, fire, mountain, shadows, and thunder, but in the eyes of a general more than two thousand years ago, his army was like these elements. This general possessed the sentiment and vision of a modern artist. The chapter “Weakness and Strength” states, “Therefore, the ultimate form of military strategy is formlessness.” The deployment of troops is tangible, but when mastered to perfection, it becomes intangible. This aligns with Lao Tzu’s philosophy of non-action yet all-encompassing action; the so-called “great formlessness” represents a state of being, a special mindset for a general in command. The chapter “Weakness and Strength” continues, “Therefore, its victories are not repeated, but its responses are infinitely varied.” Modern management emphasizes numerical precision; in the eyes of a high-ranking general, soldiers and the outcome of battles are merely numbers. When a centenarian recalls their life, the 36,000 days they’ve lived aren’t presented in such detail that each day is unique. However, in the mind of the author of *The Art of War*, every victory is different, so different that there are countless individual victories. Only when modern artists artistically portray war can they imbue thousands upon thousands of victories with distinct moods and colors.

If we read both *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu and *The Art of War* by Sun Bin, we will notice their differences. These differences are related to the transition of China into a two-tiered society during the Warring States period, making the latter more characteristic of this society: Confucius focused on society, Sun Tzu on the general, and Sun Bin viewed war from the perspective of personal experience and understanding. Therefore, *The Art of War* begins with Sun Bin’s glorious victory at Maling, where he captured Pang Juan alive, followed by “Meeting King Wei,” “King Wei’s Questions,” and then “Chen Ji’s Questions on Fortifications.” The order of King Wei and Chen Ji clearly reflects their hierarchical positions. Sun Tzu also answered questions from the King of Wu, but he did not use the king’s name to propagate his military strategies. Compared to *The Art of War*, *The Art of War* by Sun Bin significantly reduces the artistic aspects of warfare, offering a more realistic perspective and less idealism. Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* still views war from a societal perspective, pointing out the immense cost of war: “The general principle of warfare is that if one has a thousand chariots, a thousand war wagons, and a hundred thousand armored soldiers, with provisions to be supplied from a thousand li away, then the expenses, both internal and external, for guests, for glue and lacquer, and for the maintenance of chariots and armor, will amount to a thousand pieces of gold per day. Only then can an army of a hundred thousand be mobilized.” This is truly an interpretation of Lao Tzu’s saying, “After a great war, there will surely be a year of famine.” Sun Bin’s *The Art of War*, however, views war purely from the perspective of a feudal state, seeing it as the only way for a feudal state to avoid destruction. In the chapter “Meeting King Wei,” it says, “Victory is the means to prevent the destruction of a state and to continue its lineage; defeat is the means to diminish its territory and endanger its state… War is not what one desires, and victory is not what one benefits.” It also says, “To demand benevolence and righteousness, to establish rites and music, and to regulate clothing and customs, so as to prohibit strife and robbery. This is not something that Yao and Shun did not dislike, but it was unattainable, so they raised an army to restrain them.” This passage explicitly states that during the reigns of Yao and Shun, war was used to maintain peace and punish those who disrupted it. This tradition persisted even during the reign of Duke Xiang of Song, making adherence to the rules of warfare crucial. In contrast, wars during the Warring States period were fought to avoid national annihilation, and thus, any means were ruthless. Sun Bin pointed out that victory offered little benefit, as he also noted that the defeated side would have its territory reduced. Therefore, in Sun Bin’s view, seizing territory in war made the strong even stronger, but this strength was also for the purpose of avoiding national annihilation. If all the states had adopted this attitude towards war, as Sun Bin believed, a military balance would have existed, forming the basis for the long-term coexistence of the seven powerful states and a dozen or so smaller states during the more than two hundred years of the Warring States period.

Xu Tianbo believes that when Qin unified China, the people of various countries resolutely resisted, indicating that the people at that time did not have the desire for unification. [12] In fact, the situation in China at that time was like that during the two World Wars, facing two possibilities: 1) All countries cooperated to stop the attempts of military powers such as Qin and De to unify by force, and established a United Nations-style international structure to maintain peace; 2) The war was allowed to be de-moralized and de-regulated, eventually leading to the complete victory of the most immoral and ruleless military power. The world today held various international conferences before and after the two World Wars, taking the first possible path; China during the Warring States period did not hold peace conferences, taking the second possible path. Qin Shihuang adopted Li Si’s suggestion: to bribe the important officials of various countries with heavy money, and to stab those who did not accept the bribes with a sharp sword, that is, a strategy of bribery plus assassination. The success of this strategy depended on the fact that the morality of the rulers of various countries had not yet fallen to the point of universally using this strategy, and other countries did not know how to guard against it for a while. After unifying China, Qin Shi Huang did not stop breaking social rules and engaging in fraudulent activities, to the point that eight hundred laborers, including Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, were all sentenced to death for being late due to rain. If society had well-established and unified rules of conduct, such excessively harsh punishments would not have been necessary.

Influenced by the hierarchical divisions of a primitive superpower, China, even after entering a two-tiered society during the Warring States period, remained divided into different classes with little interaction, making it possible for the families of generals and the art of generalship to flourish. In contrast to this Chinese system of division, ancient Greece developed a system of forums where people from all walks of life mingled, forming a unified two-tiered social consciousness. The Athenian city-state, with a population of only around 100,000, held forty general assemblies annually, attended by 10,000 to 15,000 people, each lasting several hours, filled with speeches, debates, and elections amidst noise and arguments. Elected generals and officials typically served one-year terms. People also chatted and exchanged information daily in the city center market, acting as akin to today’s national daily newspaper and news broadcast. Furthermore, criminal cases were debated and voted on before juries of hundreds. While not all city-states were like Athens, Athens’ democratic style influenced all ancient Greek city-states and their people. As artificially created two-tiered societies, people themselves were also artificial; ancient Greece and China created entirely different people, with completely different concepts and ways of thinking. Ancient Greek generals were merely war commanders, carrying out decisions made by the general assembly. They would never have conceived of a so-called military strategy that still holds relevance to modern commerce and daily life two thousand years later. Chinese military strategy was also of little help to ancient Greek generals, because they fought different wars and faced different war cultures. After centuries of warfare, the hallmark of mature warfare was not the emergence of military strategies, but rather the ancient Greek phalanx.

The ancient Greek phalanx was prevalent between 750 BC and 300 BC, and was replaced by the Roman legions after the rise of Rome. While chariot warfare was still used in China during the Spring and Autumn Period, Greece had already transitioned to infantry combat. An ancient Greek phalanx consisted of dozens to hundreds of warriors, each carrying a large shield, a spear, a sword, and other equipment weighing over 30 kilograms. The front rank formed a metal wall of spears, impenetrable to arrows and any other weapons; if a warrior died, a replacement was immediately brought in from the rear. Cavalry guarded the flanks. This phalanx was well-suited for positional warfare and possessed formidable fighting power, but it required ironclad discipline and rules of conduct. If even one or two individuals deserted out of fear, the entire phalanx would descend into chaos. In other words, even faced with a combination of bribery and assassination tactics, ordinary Greek soldiers had no room to accept bribes and retreat. Ancient Greek warriors were mostly farmers, so warfare was seasonal. Both sides agreed beforehand on a battleground, usually a flat area. Because the battles were pre-planned, they were extremely brutal and short, typically decided within an hour, with the losing side suffering casualties of less than five percent. Generals stood at the forefront, so their casualty rate was also high. If one side dared not fight and hid in the city, the other side had the right to plunder and destroy their farmland. Ancient Greek war equipment, including warhorses, was provided by the warriors themselves, so a warrior’s rank was related to their family’s economic status.

Between 499 and 448 BC, Persia repeatedly invaded Greece but was ultimately defeated. In the final battle, Greece deployed a combined phalanx of 40,000 soldiers, while Persia had 100,000 to 200,000. Ancient Greece’s victory with fewer troops was not based on the Chinese saying, “A strong army with few soldiers is righteous” (Sun Bin’s Art of War, see King Wei), but primarily on superior equipment, phalanx tactics, and meticulous planning. These were things that the autocratic Persians could not achieve. A democratic atmosphere made it easier to pool collective wisdom and mobilize everyone’s enthusiasm. Ancient Greek warships were hundreds of feet long, had 170 rowers, and were incredibly fast. After the war with Persia, ancient Greece split into two camps for a civil war, escalating and complicating the conflict. Cavalry and archers were added, and occasional surprise attacks and sieges were conducted, but phalanx warfare remained the primary method. While China’s Warring States period also saw a period of division into the Vertical and Horizontal alliances, the situation was always a multi-faceted conflict. The maturity of ancient Greek society forced the warring parties to form two major camps, much like the two-party system in the West today.

In summary, ancient Greek infantry warfare exhibited characteristics more akin to the chariot warfare of the Spring and Autumn Period in China, emphasizing rules to minimize casualties: 1) Positional warfare with both sides lined up, the outcome determined within a day; 2) Generals or princes personally led their troops; 3) The defeated side did not necessarily suffer national destruction and could continue to exist (ancient Greece was relatively merciful towards the surrounding barbarian peoples, enslaving them); 4) The 5% casualty rate of the defeated side in ancient Greece was not high. Although there are no corresponding figures for China, it is estimated that the casualty rate in the Spring and Autumn Period would not have been higher than this, while it increased significantly during the Warring States Period; 5) Generals or princes and soldiers were on the same social level, sharing the same interests.

Sun Tzu’s *Art of War* describes warfare during the Warring States period, one of its principles being deception, which means breaking the rules. If everyone deceives, deception is ineffective; it is most effective when the majority still adheres to the rules. Sun Tzu’s deception includes deceiving one’s own soldiers, saying, “Fool the eyes and ears of your soldiers, make them ignorant.” This would have been difficult to apply in ancient Athens when a general was chosen in a chaotic, one-year term by tens of thousands of men. The Art of War, Chapter Nine: The Nine Grounds, states: “The general’s task is to remain calm and secluded, to be upright and orderly, to deceive the eyes and ears of his soldiers, so that they know nothing; to change their tasks, to alter their plans, so that they are unaware; to change their positions, to detour their routes, so that the people cannot think. When the commander sets an appointment with them, it is like climbing a high place and removing the ladder; when the commander leads them deep into the territory of the feudal lords, he opens the trap. It is like driving a flock of sheep, driving them there and there, so that they do not know where they are going. Gather the entire army and throw them into danger; this is the general’s task.” For a general to discuss so many techniques for “deceiving the eyes and ears of his soldiers” without any moral remorse is not human nature, nor can it be formed in a short time. Even more extreme, Sun Tzu’s deceiving of soldiers is also manifested in the act of burning one’s own boats and sacrificing one’s own men, while leaving a way out for the enemy: do not pursue a desperate enemy, leave an opening when surrounding the enemy. It is all for the sake of victory, showing benevolence to outsiders while being ruthless to one’s own.

According to Ge Jianxiong, this was indeed the case in Chinese history. China’s foreign relations were not characterized by Western-style conquest, enslavement, and exploitation, but rather by a kind of face-saving gesture. When the King of England wanted to show goodwill to Emperor Qianlong, Qianlong replied: “The Celestial Empire is vast and rich in resources, and has everything. I do not need anything from you.” The implication was: “Whatever you want, come and take it from me, as long as you acknowledge my status in China.” [11] In China, internal strife resulted in the deaths of more than half of the population, but generally did not involve the surrounding ethnic minorities. The West was the opposite, being ruthless in wars against foreigners, but maintaining a gentlemanly demeanor in wars against its own Europeans. [12]

30. The Differences Between Eastern and Western War Cultures:
(V) The Homeric Epics and the Romance of the Three Kingdoms: Differences in Individual Heroism in Warfare