Li Yousheng
Abstract: Dividing human society into a natural, primitive society and a man-made, two-tiered society reveals that Chinese civilization began in the primitive society while Western civilization began in the two-tiered society. Furthermore, because both Confucianism and Taoism idealize the primitive society, Chinese civilization lacks an understanding of the inhumanity of the two-tiered society. This paper re-analyzes Mao Zedong’s path and its lingering social impact from the perspective of the two-tiered society theory, arguing that this Mao Zedong phenomenon is a concentrated manifestation of the primitive society complex in traditional Chinese culture that ignores the differences between the two-tiered societies. The author begins by introducing Li Zehou’s evaluation of Mao Zedong and finally returns to two other prominent ideas presented in Mao’s *Farewell to Revolution*: historical tragedy and the philosophy of survival. The author uses the two-tiered society theory to re-examine the prominent ideas in *Farewell to Revolution*, also demonstrating the possibility of overcoming this historical predicament.
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(Continued from previous)
Both the Kuomintang revolution and the Communist revolution were introduced to stagnant China by social elites amidst the tide of Western modernization sweeping the world. Sun Yat-sen’s *Outline of National Reconstruction* divided the process of nation-building into three stages: the military-political period, the period of tutelage, and the constitutional period. In *The Fundamentals of Democracy*, Sun Yat-sen stated, “When a disorganized populace is suddenly placed in the position of masters of the Republic, it is no wonder they are at a loss, unsure of what to do. So-called assemblies are merely a mob. The Chinese people today have truly failed to take the first step towards civil rights.” He further stated, “A nation is like a person; a newborn cannot take its first steps in a single day, so how can a newly established nation leap forward overnight? A child learning to walk needs a nanny to teach them; the nation’s learning to walk should be the same. This is the reason for writing *The Fundamentals of Democracy*, to teach the people to take the first step towards civil rights.”
Sun Yat-sen’s view coincides with my theory of a two-tiered society. In the early 1950s, the vast majority of Chinese peasants still lived in a quasi-primitive society. Because both Confucianism and Taoism idealized a primitive society, China lacked a secondary society, and the establishment of space for individual activity and corresponding rules. When these people first entered a secondary society and faced with free choice, they were at a loss, unsure of what to do, because they were faced with countless possibilities and found it difficult to decide.
This is why any political party that promises immediate benefits and backs it with violence will participate. Such a revolution is not the natural, spontaneous proletarian world revolution described by Marx, which requires a long period of promotion and operation. The Xinhai Revolution was successful initially, but the Kuomintang struggled for over twenty years afterward, still holding only half the country until the Japanese invasion in 1937. If Lenin’s Soviet revolution brought forward Marx’s revolution, then Mao Zedong’s peasant revolution brought forward Lenin’s revolution once again. Such premature revolutions can only begin as sparks, with the hope of a future prairie fire. The three-to-four-year civil war following the Soviet Revolution demonstrates that the October Revolution also had its limitations.
The lack of a secondary social stratum for individual activity in Chinese history has prevented insightful individuals from engaging in mere rhetoric rather than emulating Mao Zedong’s “spark” approach. Before liberation, China had over a dozen democratic parties, but only the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were truly pragmatic. Returning to the two extremes of praise and criticism of Mao Zedong mentioned at the beginning of this article, both should learn from Mao himself: not be interested in the infighting between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but instead choose a secluded spot to ignite a spark. Why don’t those who advocate the Cultural Revolution start their own cultural revolution at home? At least they can teach their children how to rebel. If they’re burning books, they should first ignite a spark on their own bookshelves before hoping for a prairie fire. In my observation, this is how it works in Western societies, but not traditionally in Chinese society: in the West, private individuals can form parties with the intention of replacing the current regime, while Mao Zedong’s “spark” approach also chose the chaotic era of warlordism. Mao Zedong was an expert in anti-traditionalism, but he also needed to take advantage of the gaps in warlord conflicts and his own convenience in seizing power.
Looking back at the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, after Japan’s surrender, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the entire world hoped for cooperation between the two parties to avoid war. The vast majority of Chinese undoubtedly shared this view, as the eight million Kuomintang troops, like the Communist army, were composed of impoverished Chinese peasants. I spent many years in rural China during my childhood; those peasants wanted nothing but a peaceful life in their hometowns. The three-year civil war further confirmed Sun Yat-sen’s words: “When a disorganized populace is suddenly placed in the position of masters of the Republic, it is no wonder they are at a loss, unsure of what to do; their so-called assemblies are nothing but a mob.”
In a country lacking sufficient space for individual social activity, how to organize a mob suddenly placed in the position of masters and drive them toward an ideal of the future? Mao Zedong was undoubtedly an unprecedented expert in this regard. Li Zehou’s so-called two obsessions of Mao Zedong—one a blind faith in war experience, the other a blind faith in ideology—are precisely Mao Zedong’s penetrating historical insight, a reliable means of organizing a mob. If the leaders of the Wuhan Revolution had not blindly followed ideology and had started with practical action, Mao Zedong’s prairie fire revolution would have required ideology to precede it. Because his revolution was not about making minor improvements to the existing social reality, but an expedition of entirely new ideas, requiring a clear and persistent ideological momentum. Blindly following war experience is blindly following violence; pursuing a distant ideal while detached from social reality, and facing a disoriented mob, violence is inevitable. Before university, I lived in the countryside for many years. While various Communist movements were manageable in cities, they relied on violence to advance in the countryside. This was directly related to the Great Leap Forward in 1958, which resulted in the starvation of tens of millions. Starvation itself is violence, and also a result of violent coercion.
The Cultural Revolution was a utopian movement in which Mao Zedong led a minority of people while leaving the majority of leaders within the Communist Party system aside. Zhang Guotao believed that Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution for two reasons: philosophical considerations and considerations of power, but mainly the former. Zhang Guotao also believed that Mao Zedong was a peasant-style socialist with a desire for equality. Once he found that the regime he established did not provide these, or even tended to go in the opposite direction, he wanted to take drastic and unconventional actions to achieve his goal, which was an important reason for the launch of the Cultural Revolution. [6]
Zhang Guotao came from an intellectual family and entered Peking University as early as 1916. After participating in the revolution, he traveled to Hong Kong, Canada and other places. He had a unique perspective on Mao Zedong. In my article “Mao Zedong and Taoist Thought”, I specifically discussed Mao Zedong’s original social sentiment as a peasant. Mao Zedong made the mistake of ignoring the differences between the two social classes in Chinese history. He carried out a pancake-like revolution that flipped the positions of the upper and lower social classes in order to pursue the equality and friendship of the original society. However, a two-level society cannot function without class differences. The arduous struggle of the uprisings of ordinary people in the Han and Ming dynasties resulted in the same cruel reality of a two-level society. The Cultural Revolution itself is a dramatic microcosm of a historical process. [7] It is precisely because of this that Lin Biao said: “At the beginning of the struggle, we fought for equality, fairness and security. After we won the country, we realized that there are no such things in the world. It’s ridiculous.” [8]
As for Li Zehou’s statement that “war certainly involves deception (all’s fair in war), and a life-or-death struggle,” he overlooks another meaning of war: war is a way for humanity to resolve disputes. Like two bulls locked in combat, it’s conducted according to a fixed ritual, without deception or a life-or-death struggle. Human conflicts before civilization were similar, and the rules of war have persisted since civilization began, forming the basis for modern international military tribunals’ rulings: killing soldiers who have laid down their arms and innocent civilians are both crimes. Mao Zedong called Duke Xiang of Song’s actions “a foolish kind of benevolence and morality,” but wars in Duke Xiang’s Spring and Autumn period involved both sides lining up and facing each other before the battle began, somewhat like today’s sports competitions, and also similar to bullfighting. Comparing the differences between German and Japanese soldiers in World War II shows that the East was less concerned with the rules of war, such as massacring civilians and fighting to the last soldier’s death after the battle was already lost, and so on. After the Lin Biao incident in 1971, the Cultural Revolution was doomed to failure. After that, Mao Zedong often wept, even wailed, but he never surrendered to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and others until his death. This was Mao’s Eastern strategy.
Finally, returning to the two extreme factions mentioned at the beginning of this article, those who praise and criticize Mao Zedong, they no longer need to practice Mao Zedong’s approach of refusing to admit defeat and fighting to the end, especially those who regard Mao Zedong as a demon.
Li Zehou replaced the “philosophy of struggle” with a “philosophy of eating,” implying that eating is more important than fighting. For most modern people, eating is no longer a problem. According to research by the Qunsan people of South Africa, prehistoric humans also did not have a problem with eating. Just like the birds, squirrels, and deer we see, none of them are emaciated; they, like prehistoric humans, did not have a problem with eating. Humans who no longer face a problem of eating today no longer face a life-or-death issue, but rather, under conditions of coexistence, further collaboratively understanding and discerning the truth. On a matter as easily discernible as Mao Zedong’s praise or criticism, there is even less need to ignore it and fight to the end. If we replace the philosophy of struggle with the Daoist enjoyment of life and the Confucian humanistic love, future history will not unfold as Li Zehou suggests: in tragedy. The tragedy of five thousand years of human civilization lies entirely in the escalating wars caused by the multi-directional and uncontrollable nature of secondary societies.
We all adopted Mr. Li Zehou’s approach: avoiding general evaluations and then analyzing specific problems in detail, drawing on diverse perspectives, and continuously deepening our understanding of a problem without worrying about who is right or wrong. In other words, we bid farewell to revolution and embarked on a path of mutual learning and improvement, a path of historical progress without tragedy. [9]
literature
[1] Li Yousheng: Online collection of articles: http://www.confucius2000.com/writer/yousheng.htm; Personal blog: http://blog.sina.com.cn/u/3913195579.
[2] Liu Zaifu (2015): Reflections on the publication of the eighth edition of Farewell to Revolution. See: http://liuzaifu.blog.21ccom.net/?p=84.
[3] Yang Lichuan (2015): The paradox of Chinese morality: advocating collectivism but lacking public spirit.
Source: China Philanthropy and Social Innovation Research Institute, Sun Yat-sen University (WeChat ID: SOPSYSU);
(http://www.21ccom.net/articles/thought/zhongxi/20150420123837_all.html).
[4] Liang Shuming (1949, 1987): The Essence of Chinese Culture. Chengdu Luming Bookstore, 1949; Shanghai Xuelin Press, 1987.
[5] Yousheng (2012): The difference between Eastern and Western war cultures can be seen from the fact that Duke Xiang of Song was defeated by Chu due to his adherence to the rules of war. Xue Deng, Issue 24, http://www.confucius2000.com/writer/yousheng.htm.
[6] Zhang Guotao on the Cultural Revolution: Some successors will become a burden. Source: Cultural and Historical Review, No. 2, 2010. (http://www.21ccom.net/articles/history/xiandai/20150615125764_all.html)
[7] Li Yousheng (2006): Mao Zedong and Taoist thought. http://taoism21cen.com/Chinesechat/maoyudao.html.
[8] Ya Ye (2014): Lin Biao: A Brilliant Historical Mystery. Consensus Net: http://www.21ccom.net/articles/history/xiandai/20141011114527.html; Originally from: KD Community.
[9] Li Yousheng (2014): Looking at Confucius from a different perspective. Suzhou University Press.
(Completed by Li Yousheng in early July 2015)
author By Dr. You-Sheng Li
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